The Petro's “Total Peace”: A Failed Public Policy? Assessing the Negotiation Strategy and Outcomes of Colombia’s Peace Policy (2022-2026)

Abstract

This article critically examines the “Total Peace” policy implemented during Gustavo Petro’s administration (2022-2026) in order to assess whether it can be considered a failed public policy. The study analyzes the evolution and outcomes of the multiple dialogues and negotiations conducted with guerrilla organizations, dissident groups, post-paramilitary structures, and urban criminal organizations, which ultimately became the core of the government’s peace strategy. Drawing on both Colombian and international experiences in peace processes, the author identifies ten key components of successful peace negotiations and integrates them into an analytical framework based on four dimensions: strategic clarity, negotiation methodology, security and control of illegal economies, and the participation of third parties and civil society. Using this framework, the article evaluates the implementation of Petro’s peace policy and finds significant shortcomings in the definition of objectives, the characterization of armed actors, the establishment of appropriate legal frameworks, the articulation between negotiation and security policies, and the achievement of sustainable agreements. The study concludes that “Total Peace” evolved into a set of fragmented dialogues with limited outcomes, failing to produce substantial transformations in the dynamics of armed conflict or broad peace agreements. Although some territorial processes achieved partial progress, the policy ultimately resulted in a “partial peace” of a smaller scope than previous peace negotiations in Colombia.